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When Economists “Tell Histories”: the Truncated 
Story of Central Banks’ Cooperation over the 
Bimetallic Period 
Antoine Parent ∗ 
Abstract: »Wenn Wirtschaftswissenschaftler „Geschichten“ erzählen: die ver-
kürzte Geschichte der Kooperation der Zentralbanken über die bimetallische 
Periode«. In this article, we assess the meaning of the controversies about the 
French and British central banks’ solidarity over the bimetallic period (1850-
1870). Our purpose is to highlight how historical case studies can become the 
instrument of a distorted economic view. In the main stream literature, the ar-
gument of the discount rates correlation is turned into rivalry between the two 
issuing institutions. This view omits the reading of Bimetallism as a coordi-
nated discount rate policy of the French and British central banks and supports 
bimetallism as a self-equilibrating system. 
Keywords: bimetallism, central bank cooperation, cliometrics. 
Introduction 
In contrast with conventional wisdom on Bimetallism, Parent (2006) and Die-
bolt and Parent (2008 and forthcoming) found cliometric evidence that French 
and British central banks did co-operate making Bimetallism a very early regu-
lated monetary regime. This thesis calls into question the academic view ac-
cording to which the Banque de France was mainly a domestic issuing institu-
tion in the mid-19th century as well as the scepticism around the idea of central 
bank co-operation over the 19th century (Flandreau, 1997).  
We consider that most of the existing arguments corroborating the thesis of 
the non-cooperation that can be found in the literature on the double standard 
are weak and fragile. Above all, they carry a very classical view of the distinc-
tion between Economics and History, limiting the added value of History to the 
field of the historical context (as opposed to “a-historical” cliometrics). The 
purpose of this article is to underline the dangers of the supposedly neutral 
interpretation of historical features when it is actually a pretext for a specific 
economic discourse. This raises the issue of History as the instrument of his-
torical economics.  
In this article, we shall recall the controversies about the French and British 
central banks’ solidarity during the bimetallic period. Our purpose is to high-
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light how this “story” was truncated in order to corroborate a specific economic 
view. The two main channels of the story of Central banks “solidarity” consid-
ered as war are:  
- first, the thesis of non cooperation which relies on three episodes only 
over the entire bimetallic period; 
- second, the argument of the discount rates correlation turned into rivalry 
between the two issuing institutions. 
1. The controversy around central banks cooperation 
To date precisely the beginning of the cooperation between international cen-
tral banks is an important issue in recent economic literature. We review below 
the pros and the cons. Flandreau (1997) argued that “central bank cooperation 
was probably not decisive in the operation of the gold standard” (p. 735)… 
“Co-operation had been exceptional, never reciprocal, and always failed to 
institutionalize… what has been interpreted as cooperation was the product of 
the selfish interest of central banks; they helped each other only when this 
provided a direct benefit to them, instead of mutually adjusting towards some 
cooperative equilibrium as hypothesized by the cooperation view” (p. 737)... 
“It should be clear that central bank cooperation was definitely not the pre-
dominant pattern in the pre-1914 period. Hence, one must reject the view that 
central bank cooperation was an essential ingredient of exchange rate stability” 
(p. 760). This echoed Viner’s views of the mid-19th century: “Co-operation 
between central banks was during this period exceptional rather than an estab-
lished policy. On the contrary, it appears that ordinarily the central banks either 
paid little attention during this period to what was going on in other money 
markets, or else engaged in competitive increases of their discount rates and in 
raids on each other’s reserves at a time of actual or anticipated credit strin-
gency” (Viner, 1937, pp. 274-275). 
This approach is subject to debate. In the introduction to Golden fetters, Ei-
chengreen (1992) underlined that central bank co-operation had been the key to 
the exchange rate stability of the pre-1914 gold standard and contributed to this 
regime’s credibility. “The credibility of the pre-war gold standard rested on 
international co-operation… Major crises were contained through overt, con-
scious co-operation among central banks and governments… The resources 
any one country could draw on when its gold parity was under attack far ex-
ceeded its own reserves; they included the resources of the other gold standard 
countries. This provided additional ammunition for defending their gold par-
ity”. (Eichengreen, 1992, pp. 7-8). Eichengreen (1985) developed a similar 
view: “On occasion central banks and governments managed to achieve coop-
erative solutions to their problems, such as when they negotiated swap ar-
rangements, earmarked gold, or extended international loans. Both central 
banks and governments clearly recognised their interdependence” (pp. 139-
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140). In the same way, Cottrell (1982) noted that “Co-operation between 
Threadneedle Street and the Rue des Petits Champs was not a new develop-
ment… By the early 1850s co-operation, at least of an intermittent form, was a 
well established practice. The two banks exchanged information and by 1854 
telegraphed each other news of changes in their discount rates on a regular 
basis” (p. 132).  
2. The thesis of non cooperation relies on three episodes 
only over the entire bimetallic period 
Indeed, the controversy between the pros and the cons relies on a few episodes 
only. Most of the time, the arguments appear to be a pure matter of interpreta-
tion and the key point is that they refer to swap arrangements or international 
loans, not to discount rate coordination. According to Flandreau (1997, p. 740) 
“the period before 1854 seems to have been characterized by a number of suc-
cessful international actions involving the Bank of France and the Bank of 
England”... “Early examples of central bank harmony included the 1825 Lon-
don crisis… 1836, 18391…, 1846-1847” (p. 741)... “The last instance of cordial 
relations appears to have taken place in the spring of 1854… Hostilities started 
soon afterwards in August 1855”2 (pp. 745-746). Flandreau took this example 
as proof of counter-productive and non cooperative equilibrium. He cited 
                                                             
1  For instance, about the episode of 1839, Flandreau noted that Curtis in his final report 
praised d’Argout’s “influence and zealous activity that contributed to bring the matter in 
hand to a favourable consideration at the Bank of France” (p. 743). In Curtis Report, Bank 
of England archives, G4/62, cited by Flandreau, Curtis mentioned “a great desire on the 
part of the Bank of France to be able to establish a direct intercourse and interchange of 
good services between the establishment and the Bank of England… Such an arrangement 
might be of the highest advantage to the Bank of England… when it may be desirable to 
operate on the foreign exchanges … such friendly and confidential relations between the 
two establishments would tend to produce when the situation of either Bank might require 
the aid and assistance of the other.” 
2  In august 1855, facing a decline in its reserve the Bank of France (p. 746) “asked a number 
of French Banks and bullion dealers to collect bills of immediate usance payable in London 
and send gold to Paris” without increasing its discount rate. The Bank of England reacted to 
this drain by raising its discount rate from 4.5% to 5% on 1 October and to 6% on 6 Octo-
ber. A message of Weguelin, the Governor of the Bank of England, to the French Governor 
followed (cited by Flandreau, p. 747), minimising the conflict and emphasising that “both 
past relations and current necessities impelled the two banks to ‘unite their strength’ rather 
than to fight”. “Weguelin concluded with a call for intensified exchange of information” 
(cited by Flandreau, p. 747). After a claim for help from the Bank of France, Weguelin re-
fused to provide help, arguing that “the act of 1844 prevented the Bank of England from 
using its reserve to support foreign currencies” (cited by Flandreau, p. 748). According to 
Flandreau, p748, “the fight for gold appeared to be the only solution and the Bank of France 
replied in kind, raising its discount rate from 4 to 5% and subsequently to the 6% ceiling to 
meet the British policies”. 
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Bagehot’s claim for an international lender of last resort as a supplementary 
illustration that co-operation between France and England did not exist3.  
In fact, taking advantage of this episode to demonstrate the lack of co-
operation between the two establishments is probably excessive. It could either 
be considered as a kind of day-to-day hostility: Viner (1937, p. 275), for in-
stance, mentioned that “The manner in which the various commercial nations 
deal with the great mediums of exchange seems dictated by caprice rather than 
by any intelligent principle”. Newmarch and Tooke (1857, VI, section 20) did 
not consider this episode as evidence of non cooperative attitude but as a mere 
precaution against an “artificial withdrawing gold to the Bank of France”. This 
section 20 is entitled in an eloquent way ‘System pursued by the Bank of 
France in 1855-56 for the purpose of procuring temporary artificial addition to 
its bullion reserve’. The non cooperative argument appears to be questionable 
in this case: can this episode be compared to a failure of co-operation since the 
French demand did not obviously obey an imperative necessity? Cooperation 
does not necessarily mean systematic approval.  
A second episode (October 1857) mentioned by Flandreau (1997) remains 
open to debate: “the Bank of France was certainly not ready to help London 
out, and in October 1857 the Bank of England had to suspend the act of 1844” 
(p. 750). Thus, a very strong assumption is made asserting that the suspension 
of the 1844 Act was caused by the French refusal to cooperate. “Relief was 
finally provided by the removal in France of the interest rate ceiling” (Flan-
dreau, 1997, p. 750)... “It seems that the change in interest rate legislation in 
1857 in France had certainly been in part motivated by the growing conflict 
with the Bank of England, thus forcing the French to give more leeway to their 
central bank” (p. 761). It has to be noted that this change in monetary policy 
was not limited to France. Other continental countries such as Belgium also 
modified their interest rate laws at the same time.  
Diebolt and Parent (2008) gave evidence that using discount rate moves on 
the two sides of the channel revealed the will to benefit from a more useful and 
flexible regulatory tool. 
Finally, Flandreau (1997, p. 752) mentioned a third evidence of non coop-
erative patterns: “The 1866 Overend Gurney panic was met with splendid 
indifference by the Bank of France, although the abundant liquidity of the Paris 
market at the time might have rendered cooperation feasible. Indeed, the Bank 
of France then enjoyed reserves at a record level ... This was certainly not 
cooperation”. Does it mean it that the duty of the Banque de France would 
                                                             
3  “In the present cordial good understanding between France and England, it becomes the 
duty of both, to unit their strength in every way, not to divide it. I have often thought that an 
intimate correspondence upon emergencies between the two banks of France and England 
might be beneficial to both” (Gold purchases, p. 684). 
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have been to save a private financial British establishment even though the 
Bank of England did not ask for it? 
To sum up, over the 1850-1870 period, the three episodes that Flandreau 
(1997) qualified as “Anglo-French disputes of the 1850s and 1860s” (p. 755) 
could easily be considered as mere occasional difficulties. This author de-
scribed the “atmosphere of distrust in which these dealings occurred” (p. 751). 
Whatever the climate in the long run, these case studies do not concern directly 
the discount rate regulation but mainly swap arrangements. The point is that 
these dealings failed to become institutionalised and cooperation was not po-
litically sealed: “This might have been partly related to the general political 
climate between the two countries, which was not overly favourable to such 
operations… parliaments generally resisted”… “opposition from the govern-
ment certainly explains part of the secrecy” (Flandreau, 1997, p. 745). The 
difficulty to characterize the nature of the cooperation over the bimetallic pe-
riod probably comes from the fact that swap arrangements or international 
loans were usually initiated by informal contacts. As underlined by Flandreau 
“interventions operate through the agency of one or several international bank-
ers. This type of indirect arrangement could easily be understood since legal 
restrictions limited the ability of lending central banks” (Flandreau, 1997, p. 
756). This author was correct when he noted that “the negotiations had also 
revealed that the Bank of France was a complex structure. Far from being a 
well-identified entity, with clear goals and objectives, it was a club where the 
(conflicting) interests of the banking elite were brokered” (p. 742). But the fact 
that these inter-central bank agreements were negotiated by private bankers 
members of the directory board (conseil de régence) of the Banque de France 
did not change anything at all: it was simply a form of co-operation dealt with 
by agents who were most familiar with international banking transactions4. 
                                                             
4  One can observe that during the bimetallic period, each time a monetary crisis occurred, 
whether in England or in the United-States, the calls for credit to the Banque de France re-
curred. The managers of the haute banque, specialised in international settlements and ex-
change bills acceptance formed the majority of the Conseil de régence and became the 
privileged go-between for these transactions. During periods of crisis, like in 1836, the 
Conseil de régence de la Banque de France allowed a loan to the haute banque, thus trans-
ferring a part of its metallic holding to sustain foreign central banks. This co-operation still 
in its early age may sometimes occur in a hostile environment. Viner (1937, p. 233) men-
tioned that in 1836 the Bank of England requested the help of the Banque de France “of 
course reluctantly”, and added that this necessity “was considered as particularly humiliat-
ing in Great-Britain” (we cannot obviously speak yet of Entente cordiale between the two 
countries!). For Thomas Tooke (cited by Kindleberger, 1994, p. 237, and extracted from 
The Correspondance of Lord Overstone), this loan is a “national humiliation”, “a cause of 
discredit”. Nevertheless, this bitterness did not impede the transaction…  
As mentioned by Plessis (1998), “1839 is considered as the first important intervention on 
the international market: the transaction was dealed by Baring brothers; 14 Paris banks al-
lowed a loan of 50 millions to the Bank of England, guaranteed by this bank, the signature 
of the Baring and by a deposit of public assets superior to the amount of the loan. Despite it 
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Obviously, we cannot talk about the bimetallic period as one of co-operation in 
the sense of multilateralism between institutions. However, definitely denying 
the existence of cooperation over the bimetallic period in the name of central 
bank fraternity5, that probably never existed over the world, at any time, is 
equally excessive. The “solidarity” over the bimetallic period was not limited 
to some sporadic swap arrangements between the Banque de France and the 
Bank of England. The problem is that when the argument of the discount rate 
coordination could be evoked it is systematically turned into an argument of 
rivalry.  
3. Discount rate moves considered as rivalry and not 
coordination 
The “solidarity” between the Bank of England and the Banque de France refers 
to a simultaneous increase of their respective domestic discount rates. Whether 
solidarity means rivalry between central banks for the sharing of gold and 
silver is the very heart of the debate. For instance, Asselain and Plessis (2003) 
argued that Bimetallism was not a coordinated system because the contacts 
between the Bank of England and the Banque de France were restricted and 
not very tight and that this practice was not continuous and official but relied 
on a kind of diplomacy of central banks limited to some “confidential trade of 
                                                                                                                                
was forbidden to the Banque de France to allow directly this loan, the Conseil de régence 
decided to accept to discount the bills drawn by the Barings on Paris banks and accepted by 
them. Among the Conseil de régence the great majority of Paris private financial institu-
tions’ managers were present…”. If this kind of transaction cannot be precisely considered 
as a rescue of the Bank of England by the Banque de France, because the managers of Paris 
financial institutions directly co-operated with the Bank of England (just as the Rothschild 
did to help the Bank of the United States in 1839), it remains true that they did it with the 
agreement of the Banque de France (which accepted to discount the bills if needed), which 
is exactly the same.  
In 1847, the Banque de France needed money to support its metallic holding. The Bank of 
England helped her with a temporary credit of 25 millions of francs, waiting for the Banque 
de France to obtain a similar amount from Baring brothers. As had been previously the 
case, the Baring advanced money to a régent of the Banque de France (Hottinguer) against 
French rent deposits. Still in 1847, French financial institutions played an important role 
when the Banque de France sold to the Saint Petersbourg government for 50 millions of 
French rents against bills on Paris (Ramon, 1929, p. 206). Palmer, the Governor of the Bank 
of England justified in front of a parliamentary commission that it was better to agree di-
rectly with the main banks of the United-States, Hamburg, Amsterdam and Paris, rather 
than to export gold (cited by T. Joplin, p. 29). 
5  As suggested by this author: “That the Bank of France performed essentially similar opera-
tions with both private and central banks shows that such dealings are appropriately de-
scribed as those of merchants who find mutal benefits in exchanging assets, rather than as 
landmarks of international fraternity” (Flandreau, 1997, p. 752). But should cooperation 
necessarily mean central bank fraternity? 
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opinions and informations”. In the literature the analysis of cooperation 
through the channel of united action on discount rate by the Banque de France 
and the Bank of England is very peculiar: in no way is the issue of the effi-
ciency of the discount rate regulation (for instance on the exchange rate) raised. 
Cooperation is seen as simple simultaneity of discount rate decisions and is 
associated with a non cooperative strategy: “It was not pure coincidence that 
the directory board (Conseil de régence) met rue de la Vrillière at the same 
time as the directors of the Bank of England did since they looked for reacting 
promptly to the decisions of the later and at adapting their behaviour immedi-
ately, if necessary” (Plessis, 1998, p. 116)... “The Conseil de régence did not 
hesitate to meet in extraordinary session once it had been informed by a tele-
graph from London; it did it without delay. As a matter of fact, British and 
French discount rates’ increases very often occurred the same day” (Plessis, 
1998). The simultaneity of meetings written in the agenda of the Banque de 
France is considered here as a signal of hostility. 
Does a concomitant increase of discount rates necessarily define a retalia-
tory measure against the adverse issuing institution? On the one side, Patterson 
(1867, pp. 2-6) denounced the “war between banks”. Mentioning the succes-
sive increases in the discount rates, he regretted that central banks “made a new 
kind of war, both civil and international, disastrous for the industry… in 1857 
and 1864, the Bank of England went over to the offensive. The simple an-
nouncement that the Bank of England increased its discount rate run over 
Europe through the telegraph like an electric flame and each bank engaged the 
fight… The Bank of England increases its discount rate: it is the first step, the 
act of war… Immediately, the banks of other countries do the same”. In the 
famous Enquête sur la circulation monétaire et financière, this author wished 
for the end of “this system of rivalry and antagonisms” and called for a volun-
tary co-operation between issuing institutions. The follow-the-herd attitude of 
the Banque de France was denounced by Pereire: “The first concern of the 
Banque de France is the danger that an increase in the British discount rate 
represents for its metallic holdings”. They blamed the directors (régents) for 
“following servilely” the injunctions of the Bank of England and finally for 
their “docility” to import in France foreign monetary crises (cited by Plessis, 
1998).  
This thesis is still vivid. “The solidarity between banks meant in fact a hard 
competition for the sharing of the metallic stock” (Plessis, 1998). In this view, 
each issuing institution once facing a decrease in its own specie holdings is 
supposed to try to draw on other central banks’ metallic holdings. The Peel’s 
Act, which forbad the Bank of England to issue for more than 350 millions 
francs of notes uncovered by the equivalent in specie, encouraged the Bank of 
England to keep or get specie using discount rate increases. The historian of the 
Banque de France Plessis (1998) talks about “savage competition” and pre-
sents discount rates increases as a substitute means for specie purchases. Thus, 
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the Banque de France could easily “modify and take advantage of the effects 
of this international solidarity” (Plessis, 1998).  
Obviously, this approach does not test its core proposition. We do not have 
any econometric test of the impact of the discount rate differential on the bi-
metallic stock holdings in France and England, nor do we have a measurement 
of the incidence of the discount rate differential on any outcome variable (such 
as the exchange rate; see for that Diebolt and Parent, 2008). Yet before drawing 
any definite conclusion, it would have been interesting to test the stabilizing 
properties of the discount rate differential on the bimetallic snake (Diebolt and 
Parent, 2008). More amazingly the notion of cooperation is defined without 
any reference to discount rate coordination (of which the discount rate differen-
tial is a proxy, see on that point Diebolt and Parent, 2008). This approach of the 
cooperation between central banks simply omits the channel of discount rate 
coordination. How could this view of non cooperation between central banks 
become so easily the cornerstone of conventional wisdom? In conclusion, we 
suggest an explanation. 
Conclusion 
Our reading is that the thesis of non cooperation between central banks is use-
ful to the economic interpretation of Bimetallism as a self equilibrating system. 
Despite the extreme weakness of the historical arguments that we have dis-
cussed above (omission of cooperation as discount rate coordination, a hy-
pothesis simply rejected and not tested; only two verified episodes of lending 
refusals between the British and French central banks over more than fifty 
years of Bimetallism), we consider that limiting the explorations of the influ-
ence of discount rate coordination on the Bimetallism stability has been a way 
of sealing the economic orthodox approach of Bimetallism. Indeed, the ortho-
dox literature on Bimetallism insists on the self equilibrating role of bimetallic 
mechanisms. Velde and Weber (2000) showed that bimetallism was feasible, 
sustainable and stable. Oppers (2000) assessed the stabilizing effect of Bimetal-
lism as being similar to that of an exchange rate target zone with bimetallic 
boundaries playing the role of reflecting barriers and the mint parity the part of 
absorbing barrier. By applying a monetary approach of the balance of payment 
Flandreau (1995, 1996, 2004) assumed that the double standard was an auto-
matic system driven by market forces where the arbitrage between bills and 
specie markets kept the exchange rate back to the parity. In this tradition, the 
interest rate plays no role at all and discount rate coordination is not useful 
since the system is supposed to have self-equilibrating properties. In this article 
we have illustrated how using the historical context could distort the meaning 
of Bimetallism by sealing the academic view. Using history in a cliometric 
perspective (Diebolt and Parent, 2008) surely contrasts with the existing litera-
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ture and delivers a revised story of bimetallism, certainly more in accordance 
with historical features.  
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